The Highest Ground: Why The Space Domain Matters in Defence

For decades, military power was measured by dominance across land, sea and air. Today, however, another operational environment has become impossible to ignore. Space has rapidly evolved from a supporting capability into a contested and strategically critical domain in its own right. Satellites now underpin communications, navigation, intelligence gathering, missile warning systems, financial infrastructure and modern precision warfare. Without access to space-based systems, modern militaries would struggle to coordinate operations, maintain situational awareness or project power effectively (1,2,4).

Image by Hiatus _ The Defence Design and Communications Agency

From Support Function to Strategic Dependency

The idea that space is merely a scientific or commercial frontier is now outdated. In geopolitical and military terms, it has become the highest ground.

Modern defence operations are increasingly dependent on space infrastructure. Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) services provided through satellite constellations such as GPS enable precision-guided munitions, battlefield navigation and synchronised military activity across multiple theatres. Satellite communications allow deployed forces to maintain secure and resilient links over vast distances, while Earth observation systems provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities that are central to modern command structures (1,2,6).

This dependency means that space systems are no longer peripheral assets. They are core components of military effectiveness. If degraded or denied, the consequences would extend far beyond the battlefield. Civilian infrastructure, logistics networks, emergency services, energy grids and financial systems all rely heavily on space-enabled capabilities. The space domain therefore sits at the centre of both national security and economic resilience (1,3).

Strategic Responses from NATO, the EU and the UK

This growing importance has forced governments and alliances to reconsider how they view space. NATO formally recognised space as an operational domain in 2019, joining land, sea, air and cyberspace. The alliance has increasingly emphasised the importance of maintaining freedom of operation in space and ensuring that member states can protect critical space-based infrastructure against disruption or attack (2). While NATO has clarified that it has no intention to weaponise space itself, it recognises that hostile actions in orbit could have direct consequences on collective defence (2).

Similarly, the European Union has accelerated efforts to strengthen its approach to space security and defence. The EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence highlights concerns surrounding anti-satellite weapons, cyberattacks targeting space infrastructure and the increasing militarisation of orbital environments (1,4). European policymakers now recognise that space capabilities are essential for strategic autonomy, particularly as geopolitical tensions continue to rise and global dependencies on digital infrastructure deepen (1,4).

The United Kingdom has also moved to strengthen its position within the space domain. The UK Defence Space Strategy outlines ambitions to operationalise space more effectively across defence while improving resilience and collaboration with allies and industry (6). The strategy acknowledges that future military advantage will depend not only on physical assets but also on the ability to operate effectively in highly connected and information-driven environments (5,6).

This shift reflects a wider transformation in warfare itself. Military effectiveness is no longer determined solely by mass or firepower. Information superiority, speed of decision-making and networked operational awareness increasingly define success. Space systems are fundamental to enabling all three (5,6).

Conflict in Orbit: Lessons from Ukraine

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated this reality with exceptional clarity. Commercial satellite imagery, low Earth orbit communications systems and real-time intelligence sharing have all played visible roles throughout the conflict. Civilian and commercial technologies that were once viewed primarily through economic or scientific lenses are now directly influencing military operations and national resilience. The distinction between commercial space infrastructure and defence capability is becoming increasingly blurred (5,7).

At the same time, adversaries are developing capabilities specifically designed to disrupt or degrade space systems. Anti-satellite missiles, orbital interference technologies, cyberattacks and electronic warfare capabilities are now central components of strategic competition between major powers. This has transformed space from a relatively uncontested environment into one that is increasingly congested, competitive and contested (1,2,4).

The vulnerability of space infrastructure presents unique challenges. Satellites are difficult and expensive to replace quickly, while many critical systems operate in predictable orbital paths that can potentially be tracked or targeted. Even non-destructive interference, such as signal jamming or cyber intrusion, can significantly impact military operations without creating the political consequences associated with kinetic attacks (5,6).

Defence planners are therefore increasingly focused on resilience rather than simple dominance. This includes diversifying satellite constellations, integrating commercial providers, improving redundancy and developing rapid launch capabilities that allow replacement assets to be deployed quickly if systems are compromised. The rise of smaller and more agile satellite platforms is changing how governments think about survivability in orbit (6,7).

This changing landscape is also reshaping relationships between governments and private industry. Historically, space capability was dominated by state-led programmes requiring enormous budgets and long development cycles. Today, commercial companies play a major role in launch services, communications infrastructure, satellite manufacturing and Earth observation capabilities (3,8).

As a result, defence organisations are increasingly reliant on commercial innovation. This creates opportunities for faster technological advancement, but also introduces new vulnerabilities surrounding ownership, cybersecurity and supply chain dependence. Protecting national interests in space therefore requires close coordination between governments, industry and international partners (1,5).

Smaller nations are also recognising the strategic importance of space. Denmark, for example, has highlighted how evolving geopolitical realities are reshaping its space sector, particularly in relation to Arctic security and broader defence considerations (10). Across Europe, governments increasingly view space capability not simply as a technological ambition but as a component of sovereign resilience (1,4).

The importance of the Arctic further reinforces why space matters strategically. As polar regions become more economically and militarily significant, satellite systems provide vital communications and monitoring capabilities in areas where traditional infrastructure is limited. Space assets enable maritime surveillance, environmental monitoring and military awareness across vast and remote territories (10).

Governance Gaps in Space

Yet despite its importance, the space domain still presents unresolved legal and ethical questions. International frameworks governing space activity were largely developed during a different technological and geopolitical era. Existing treaties struggle to address the realities of commercial mega-constellations, dual-use technologies and emerging counterspace capabilities. The pace of technological development is significantly outstripping the evolution of international governance structures (1,4).

This creates a risk that strategic competition in space could escalate without clear norms or mechanisms for deconfliction. Unlike traditional military domains, actions in space can create long-term consequences that affect all actors. Orbital debris generated through destructive anti-satellite tests, for instance, can remain hazardous for decades and threaten civilian as well as military systems (1,2).

The challenge for governments and alliances is therefore twofold. They must develop the capabilities required to protect national interests in space while simultaneously supporting international stability and responsible behaviour in orbit. Balancing deterrence, resilience and cooperation will define the future security environment of the space domain (2,4).

Ultimately, space matters in defence because modern society itself depends upon it. From communications and navigation to intelligence gathering and economic infrastructure, space-enabled systems underpin both military operations and civilian life. The countries that can secure resilient access to these capabilities will hold significant strategic advantages in an increasingly interconnected world (1,3,6).

Why Space Defines Future Power

The space domain is no longer a distant supporting environment operating quietly above the Earth. It has become an active theatre of geopolitical competition, technological innovation and strategic vulnerability. As military, economic and digital systems become more interconnected, the importance of protecting and operating within space will only continue to grow.

The highest ground is no longer defined by mountains, oceans or air superiority alone. Increasingly, it is measured in orbit.

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References:

1.        Chatham House. (2025). SDR presents opportunity for UK to become leader in space if it followed with urgent investment. Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/06/sdr-presents-opportunity-uk-become-leader-space-if-it-followed-urgent-investment

2.        Council of the European Union. (n.d.). Space security and defence. Council of the European Union. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/space-security-and-defence

3.        European Commission. (n.d.). EU space. European Commission. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space_en

4.        European Commission. (n.d.). EU space strategy for security and defence. European Commission. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space/eu-space-strategy-security-and-defence_en

5.        Euronews. (2026). Space defence: How is the EU boosting its military space capabilities? https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/04/07/space-defence-how-is-the-eu-boosting-its-military-space-capabilities

6.        Government of the United Kingdom. (2022). Defence space strategy: Operationalising the space domain. GOV.UK. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-space-strategy-operationalising-the-space-domain

7.        Government of the United Kingdom. (n.d.). Space programme. GOV.UK. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/space-programme

8.        NATO. (n.d.). NATO’s approach to space. NATO. https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/natos-approach-to-space

9.        Royal United Services Institute. (n.d.). Between ambition and reality: How space fits the UK defence framework. RUSI. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/emerging-insights/between-ambition-and-reality-how-space-fits-uk-defence-framework

 10.  Space Denmark. (n.d.). How a new front line is changing Denmark’s space industry. Space Denmark. https://spacedenmark.dk/how-a-new-front-line-is-changing-denmarks-space-industry