From Kinetic Threats to Biological Risk:
How Western Defence Postures Must Evolve
For decades, Western defence strategy has been shaped by kinetic threats, conventional military power, territorial defence, and deterrence based on visible force. Air superiority, naval dominance, armoured manoeuvre, and missile systems have remained the backbone of security planning. While these capabilities are still essential, they are no longer sufficient on their own. Biological risk is emerging as a strategic defence issue that challenges the assumptions underpinning traditional military postures.
Biological threats differ fundamentally from kinetic ones. They can spread invisibly, cross borders without friction, and generate large-scale disruption without immediate attribution. Their impact is not limited to military forces but extends directly into civilian populations, critical infrastructure, economies, and political legitimacy. The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated how a biological event, regardless of intent, can destabilise societies at a scale comparable to major armed conflict (1).
Biological Risk as a Defence Challenge
Biological weapons are not a new concern. During the Cold War, several states invested heavily in offensive biological programmes, despite international prohibitions. The existence of the Soviet biological weapons programme, revealed after the collapse of the USSR, showed that biological capabilities could be developed covertly and at scale (2). In response to such threats, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) entered into force in 1975, banning the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons (3).
However, unlike nuclear arms control regimes, the BWC lacks a robust verification mechanism. Compliance largely depends on transparency, confidence-building measures, and political norms. At the same time, advances in biotechnology, synthetic biology, and data-driven life sciences have lowered the technical barriers associated with biological manipulation. Tools developed for medicine, agriculture, and research are inherently dual use, meaning they can be repurposed for hostile objectives (4).
From a defence perspective, this creates a complex risk environment. Biological threats may emerge naturally, accidentally, or deliberately. In all cases, the effects on national security can be severe, overwhelming health systems, degrading military readiness, disrupting supply chains, and eroding public trust.
The Limits of Kinetic Deterrence
Traditional deterrence relies on clear attribution and credible retaliation. Biological incidents rarely offer either. Determining intent or origin can take months or years, if it is possible at all. This ambiguity weakens classical deterrence models and creates opportunities for grey-zone activity, where adversaries can exploit uncertainty to impose costs without triggering a military response.
Western defence institutions have begun to acknowledge this challenge. NATO’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Policy recognises biological threats as a core security concern and calls for improved preparedness, detection, and response across the Alliance (5). However, biological risk has yet to be fully integrated into defence planning as a distinct operational problem, comparable to cyber or space.
Resilience as a Defence Capability
As deterrence becomes less reliable, resilience becomes central. Defence against biological risk depends on the ability to detect threats early, respond rapidly, and recover effectively. This requires close integration between military forces, public health systems, intelligence services, and civilian authorities.
The 2022 United States’ National Biodefense Strategy explicitly frames biological threats as a national security issue and emphasises cross-government coordination, surveillance, and rapid response capabilities (6). Early warning systems, including environmental monitoring and health data analytics, provide decision advantage by enabling authorities to act before outbreaks escalate.
From a defence standpoint, resilience also contributes to deterrence by denial. If a state can demonstrate that biological disruption will have limited strategic effect, the incentive to pursue such methods diminishes. Investments in diagnostics, vaccine platforms, stockpiles, and logistics are therefore not just health measures, but components of national defence.
Implications for Western Alliances
For Western alliances, biological risk exposes gaps in collective defence structures. NATO operates on interoperability and shared responsibility, yet member states vary widely in their biosecurity capabilities. Analysts argue that biology should be treated as a domain of operations, requiring shared standards, joint exercises, and integrated command and control frameworks (7).
Biological threats also blur the boundary between civilian and military spheres. Defence planning must therefore incorporate civil preparedness, public communication, and trust management. Poor communication can amplify disruption, while effective messaging can reduce panic and maintain social cohesion.
Because biological risk is transnational, collective resilience is only as strong as the weakest link. Shared surveillance networks, information exchange, and coordinated response mechanisms are essential to reducing strategic surprise across the Alliance.
Looking Ahead
Despite increased attention, biosecurity remains under-resourced compared to conventional military capabilities. Governance is fragmented, and long-term investment often struggles to compete with immediate kinetic priorities (8). Yet recent initiatives, including NATO-backed innovation funding for biotechnology and early warning systems, suggest a gradual shift toward integrating biological considerations into defence planning (9).
The future security environment will not replace kinetic threats with biological ones, but it will increasingly combine them. Western defence postures must evolve accordingly, expanding the definition of security to include resilience against biological disruption. Defence in the twenty-first century will depend not only on the ability to fight wars, but on the capacity to anticipate, absorb, and recover from biological shocks.
References
(1) World Health Organization. (2023). Strengthening preparedness for health emergencies.
https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/emergency-preparedness/who_hepr_wha2023-21051248b.pdf
(2) Frischknecht, F. (2003). The history of biological warfare: Human experimentation, modern nightmares and lone madmen in the twentieth century. EMBO Reports, 4(Suppl 1), S47–S52.
https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC1326439/
(3) United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. (2022). Biological Weapons Convention.
https://disarmament.unoda.org/en/our-work/weapons-mass-destruction/biological-weapons
(4) National Academies of Sciences. (2018). Biodefense in the age of synthetic biology.
https://www.nationalacademies.org/read/24890
(5) NATO. (2022). NATO’s policy on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence.
(6) The White House. (2022). National biodefense strategy.
(7) Royal United Services Institute. (2023). Securing strategic advantage: Biosecurity and NATO.
(8) Terrorism and Disaster Center. (2025). Global threats of biological weapons and Western vulnerability.
https://tdcenter.org/2025/07/24/global-threats-of-biological-weapons-and-thewests-vulnerability/
(9) NATO Review. (2024). Biotechnology and the future of defence.
